Relative deprivation as a cause of risky behaviors by Stark, Oded
University of Tübingen
Working Papers in
Economics and Finance
No. 125
Relative deprivation as a cause of risky behaviors
by
Oded Stark
Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences
www.wiwi.uni-tuebingen.de
 
 
Relative deprivation as a cause of risky behaviors  
 
by 
 
Oded Stark 
Universities of Bonn, Tuebingen, and Warsaw  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mailing Address: Oded Stark November 2019 
 ZEF, University of Bonn 
 Walter-Flex-Strasse 3 
 D-53113 Bonn 
  Germany 
 
E-Mail Address: ostark@uni-bonn.de 
 
I am indebted to a reviewer for kind words and constructive comments, and to Noah 
Friedkin for advice and guidance.  
 
 
Abstract 
Combining a standard measure of concern about low relative wealth and a standard 
measure of relative risk aversion leads to a novel explanation of variation in risk-taking 
behavior identified and documented by social psychologists and economists. We obtain 
two results: (1) Holding individual i’s wealth and his rank in the wealth distribution 
constant, the individual’s relative risk aversion decreases when he becomes more 
relatively deprived as a result of an increase in the average wealth of the individuals who 
are wealthier than he is. (2) If relative deprivation enters the individual’s utility function 
approximately linearly then, holding constant individual i’s wealth and the average 
wealth of the individuals who are wealthier than he is, the individual’s relative risk 
aversion decreases when he becomes more relatively deprived as a result of a decline in 
his rank. Our findings provide a theoretical support for evidence about the propensity of 
relatively deprived individuals to gamble and resort to other risky behaviors.  
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1. Introduction 
Research in social psychology links relative deprivation with gambling, viewing relative 
deprivation as a factor that may account for the tendency of some people to gamble 
(Callan et al., 2008; Haisley et al., 2008). Social psychologists have sought to explain this 
link, conjecturing that because relative deprivation is an aversive state, people are 
motivated to reduce it by engaging in various behaviors that will enable them to achieve 
the outcomes they feel they merit: gambling offers a means by which people attempt to 
allay their relative deprivation. Callan et al. (2008) reason that because gambling offers 
the prospect of improving one’s financial situation swiftly and dramatically, it may be 
perceived by people as an avenue - and perhaps the only avenue - to achieve the 
outcomes (status, money) they feel they deserve in life. It is as if demand for the burst of 
intense pleasure that arises from winning at gambling rises with relative deprivation. 
Specifically, Callan et al. report that higher relative deprivation is significantly associated 
with stronger urges to gamble. In one experiment, they find that higher relative 
deprivation leads to increased gambling. In another experiment, they observe that 
participants who are led to believe that they have less discretionary income than their 
comparators opt to engage in real gambling more frequently than do participants who 
believe that they have a similar level of discretionary income as their comparators. Callan 
et al. (2011) refine the intervening variable between relative deprivation and the 
inclination to gamble, arguing that relative deprivation increases the desire for immediate 
rewards which, in turn, leads to increased gambling. This line of reasoning is consistent 
with evidence of a link between “financial deprivation” and increased gambling (Cross, 
2000; Wheeler et al., 2006; Blalock et al., 2007; Callan et al., 2008; Beckert and Lutter, 
2009). Beckert and Lutter (2013) who study lottery gambling by poor people, do not refer 
explicitly to relative deprivation, but present a reasoning that comes quite close to 
drawing on this concept. Beckert and Lutter write (pp. 2-3): “we test deprivation . . . that 
explains lottery gambling through . . . disadvantaged social position and assume that 
lottery participation serves as compensation for and release of tensions arising from 
social inequalities and feelings of deprivation,” adding that “to people of a lower social 
status situations . . . lottery gambling has a greater attraction than to people of a higher 
social status.” 
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Research in economics provides additional and broader links between relative 
deprivation and risky behavior. Kawachi et al. (1999) present evidence, based on data 
taken from the US General Social Surveys, that relative deprivation leads to violent 
crimes, which can be perceived as risky choices. Using data for males from the US 
National Health Interview Survey and from the US Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance 
System, Eibner and Evans (2005) report that high relative deprivation is related to 
increased probability of risky behaviors such as smoking and not using seatbelts. 
Drawing on data from the US National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health, Balsa et 
al. (2014) find that relative deprivation is positively associated with substance abuse 
(alcohol consumption, drinking to intoxication levels, and smoking cigarettes) for 
adolescent males but, interestingly, not for adolescent females.  
Using data on deaths by suicide in the US so as to identify the importance of 
interpersonal comparisons and “relative status,” Daly et al. (2013) found compelling 
evidence that individuals care not only about their own income but also about the income 
of others in their local area: Daly et al. showed that individual suicide risk rises with 
others’ income. This finding was obtained using two separate and independent data sets, 
suggesting that it is not an artifact of a particular sample design of either data set. The 
finding is robust to alternative specifications and cannot be explained by geographical 
variation in suicide classification, cost of living, or access to emergency medical care. 
Specifically, treating suicide as a choice variable regarding current life satisfaction and 
assessed value of future life, Daly et al. examined the relationship between suicide risk 
and one’s own and others’ income, using data from two independent sources: the 
National Longitudinal Mortality Study (NLMS) and data from publicly available death 
certificates combined with the 5% Public Use Micro Sample (PUMS) of the 1990 
decennial census. Holding an individual’s income constant, they found that others’ 
income, measured by local area (county) median income, was positively and significantly 
correlated with suicide risk. The relative income association holds for individuals across 
the income distribution, suggesting that suicide risk rises with median county income for 
both high-income and low-income individuals. That the finding applies also to high-
income individuals emphasizes that absolute income per se does not shield an individual 
from feeling relative deprivation. The finding is consistent with the idea that relative 
 
3 
deprivation, rather than one’s own absolute income, matters for wellbeing (happiness), 
and that the stress it causes can be severe enough to make people take their own life.  
Mo (2014) inquires how vulnerability to being trafficked involves willingness to 
acquiesce to dangerous economic opportunities: specifically, Mo asks whether relative 
deprivation can lead individuals to be more risk-seeking, putting themselves and their 
children at risk of modern forms of slavery. Using a controlled survey experiment 
conducted in trafficking-prone areas of Nepal, she finds that relative deprivation induces 
more risk-seeking behavior with regard to economic opportunities. 
What explains the relationship between relative deprivation and these behaviors? 
How do the findings reported above and similar ones relate to risk preferences, to 
people’s wealth, and to low income? Specifically, does a sense of relative deprivation 
cause people to become less relatively risk averse and, consequently, to exhibit riskier 
conduct?  
The purpose of this paper is to outline a framework that can yield analytically the 
observations of social psychologists and economists. A common way of progressing in 
science is to construct a theory, derive testable propositions, and then pursue empirical 
inquiry. Here, we proceed in reverse order: we seek to substantiate the appeal and 
strengthen the validity of reported empirical insights by demonstrating that they can be 
derived theoretically.  
In brief, what we do is as follows. By combining a standard measure of relative 
deprivation and a standard measure of relative risk aversion we are able to link variation 
in risk-taking behavior with changes in the level of relative deprivation. In order to 
investigate the pure effect of relative deprivation of an individual, we hold the 
individual’s wealth constant. We then identify two ways in which an individual can 
become more relatively deprived: an increase in the average wealth of individuals who 
are wealthier than he is, and a decline in his rank in the wealth distribution. It is easy to 
illustrate these two changes, given the measure of relative deprivation that we employ in 
this paper and present in equation (2) in Section 2, namely the aggregate of the excesses 
of the levels of wealth of others, divided by the size of the population (the reference 
group). Let the ascending distribution of five individuals, who are indexed by i, be given 
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by the levels of their wealth: 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5. We also refer to these initial levels of 
wealth as the names of the individuals. We consider individual 3i   whose rank is third. 
(Here, individual 5 holds the first rank, individual 4 holds the second rank, and so on.) 
The relative deprivation of individual 3 is 
1 3
(1 2) .
5 5
    When the average wealth of the 
wealthier individuals becomes higher than 4.5 then, holding the other levels of wealth 
unchanged and, thus, holding the individual’s rank constant, the relative deprivation of 
individual 3 increases because the aggregate of the excesses is bigger than (1 2) . 
Conversely, let the average wealth of the wealthier individuals remain unchanged, and let 
an individual who is positioned to the left of individual 3 in the wealth distribution 
become richer than 3. For example, let individual 2 gain 2.5 units of wealth. Then, 
individual 3 loses one rank position (in the new distribution 1, 3, 4, 4.5, and 5, individual 
3 is now fourth), while at 4.5 the average wealth of the richer individuals remains 
unchanged. Once again, the relative deprivation of individual 3 increases.  
It is worth adding that our approach to the social context in which preferences 
towards risk taking are formed differs from an approach taken in the psychological 
literature with regard to the influence of group affiliation on risk-taking behavior. That 
literature presents approaches such as a “risky shift” (Stoner, 1961), where the risk 
tolerance in the decision-making of a group is higher than the average risk tolerance of 
the individual members of the group, and a “cautious shift” (Wallach et al., 1963), where 
a decreased propensity to take risks is attributed to responsibility for the wellbeing of the 
group. In our approach, it is not group membership per se but, rather, the position in the 
group’s wealth hierarchy that shapes risk preferences. This distinction becomes apparent 
when we show that it is a change of an individual’s position in a group, rather than a 
change of the individual’s group of affiliation or of the size of the group, which affects 
the individual’s risk-taking behavior.  
Our modeling framework yields two results: (1) Holding individual i’s wealth and 
his rank in the wealth distribution constant, the individual’s relative risk aversion 
decreases when he becomes more relatively deprived as a result of an increase in the 
average wealth of the individuals who are wealthier than he is. (2) If relative deprivation 
enters the individual’s utility function approximately linearly, then holding constant 
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individual i’s wealth and the average wealth of the individuals who are wealthier than he 
is, the individual’s relative risk aversion decreases when he becomes more relatively 
deprived as a result of a decline in his rank. 
In Section 2, we show that an individual is less relatively risk averse when he is 
more relatively deprived. In Section 3, we conclude. In the Appendix we show that the 
claims presented in Section 2 can reside in a utility representation that is more general 
than the one drawn upon in Section 2. 
2. The relative risk aversion of an individual declines with (a measure of) his relative 
deprivation  
How does relative deprivation affect relative risk aversion? In this section, we show that, 
holding the wealth of an individual constant, the individual’s relative risk aversion 
decreases when he becomes more relatively deprived. The events that cause the rise in 
relative deprivation are an increase in the average wealth of the individuals wealthier than 
him (Claim 1), and a loss of rank in the wealth distribution (Claim 2). In this paper, we 
use relative deprivation as a convenient abbreviation of relative wealth deprivation. 
Consider a population of n individuals with wealth levels 1,..., nw w , such that 
1 20 ... nw w w    . Let the utility function of individual i be , )( ii iu RDw  where iw  is 
the wealth level of individual i, and iRD  is the relative deprivation (as defined in (2) 
below) of individual i. We assume that , )( ii iu RDw  is twice continuously differentiable 
and strictly increasing with respect to iw , and continuously differentiable and strictly 
decreasing with respect to iRD . Specifically, we let , )( ii iu RDw  be 
 (1 )( , ) ) ( ( )i i i i ii iw R DD Rv wu
   ,  (1) 
where ( )v  , is a twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly concave 
function that describes the preferences towards one’s own wealth; (0,1)i   is the 
intensity of the concern of individual i about having low relative wealth (being relatively 
deprived); iRD  is the index of relative deprivation defined as  
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1
1
( )
n
j i
j i
i w wRD
n  
   for 1,2,..., 1i n  ; 0nRD   (2) 
and (1,2)  . By assuming this range for the parameter  , we introduce a (small) 
degree of concavity of the utility function with respect to relative deprivation. In 
choosing 1  , we assume that the individual’s utility decreases faster when his wealth 
falls farther below the wealth of others.1 Unless specified otherwise, we will refer 
henceforth to relatively deprived individuals, namely we will employ the first part of (2). 
The index of relative deprivation presented in (2) is essentially provided by the 
received literature. In Stark (2013), we provide a brief account of the history of relative 
deprivation in economics as well as of the rationale that has guided the construction of 
the widely used index (2) as a measure of (a means of quantifying) the repercussions of 
the individuals’ engagement in social comparisons. An axiomatic foundation for (2) is 
provided in Stark et al. (2017).  
It is helpful to rewrite the index of relative deprivation in a slightly different form  
  1
1
1
( )
n
jn
j i
ji ii i i
j i
w
n i n i n i
w w w w w
n in n i n
R
n
D
 
 
 
 
            



 , (3) 
where 
1
1
j
j
i
n
i
w w
n i  


  is the average wealth of the individuals who are richer than i 
(these individuals are positioned to his right in the wealth distribution). The measure of 
individual i’s low relative wealth assumes that the manner in which placement in the 
wealth distribution measured is cardinal, that is, the magnitude of the wealth of those 
placed higher up in the wealth hierarchy matters to an individual rather than merely their 
position (and thereby his own rank) in the wealth hierarchy. 
For brevity’s sake, we henceforth refer to , )( ii iu RDw  as )(i iu w . Drawing on (3), 
we rewrite the utility function in (1) as 
                                                 
1 From (2), it follows that the index of relative deprivation of individual i is linear with respect to i’s wealth. 
Therefore, if not for the incorporation of  , the relative deprivation term will vanish in the differentiation 
undertaken below in the calculation of i’s relative risk aversion. 
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 (1 )
(1 ) (
( ) ) (
) ( ) .
i i i i i
i i
i
i i
i
i
n i
u w w
n
n i
ww w
n
w v w
v



 
 

  
 
  
 
  





 
The derivatives of this utility function have the following forms: 
 
1( ) (1 ) ( ) ( )ii i i i i i
n i
u w v w w w
n


   
      
 
, (4) 
and 
 
2( ) (1 ) ( ) ( 1) ( )ii i i i i i
n i
u w v w w w
n

    
       
 
. (5) 
As per Pratt (1964) and Arrow (1965, 1970), two measures of risk aversion, 
namely the coefficient of relative risk aversion (RRA), ( )i ir w , and the coefficient of 
absolute risk aversion (ARA), ( )i ia w , of individual i, taken while holding the wealth 
levels of all the other individuals 1 1 1( ,..., , ,..., )i i nw w w w   constant, are defined, 
respectively, by 
 ( )
( )
( )i i i
i i
i i
w u w
r w
wu




 
and 
 
(
( )
( )
)
.i ii i
i i
a
u w
w
u w



  
The measures are well-defined in some neighborhood of iw  such that 1 1i i iw w w   . 
Because the results reported below apply equally to these two measures of risk 
aversion (the proofs regarding ARA are analogous to the proofs regarding RRA), we 
limit our attention to the coefficient of relative risk aversion. 
Using (4) and (5), we get that 
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2
1
(1 ) ( ) ( 1) ( )
( )
(1 ) ( ) ( )
i i i i ii
i i i
ii
i i
n i
w v w w w
n
r w
n i
v w w w
n




  
 


        
  
    
 
.  (6) 
We now have in place the components needed to formulate and prove two claims 
that forge a link between relative deprivation and relative risk aversion. 
Claim 1. Holding individual i’s wealth and his rank constant, the individual’s 
relative risk aversion decreases when he becomes more relatively deprived because the 
average wealth of the individuals wealthier than him increases. 
Proof. Because an increase of iw  decreases the numerator of (6) and increases the 
denominator of (6), it follows that 
 
( )
0i
i
idr w
dw
 .  
Q.E.D. 
The observed link between “financial deprivation” and increased gambling 
(Cross, 2000; Wheeler et al., 2006; Blalock et al., 2007; Callan et al., 2008; Beckert and 
Lutter, 2009) provides empirical support for Claim 1: higher relative deprivation induces 
riskier pursuits.  
Claim 2. If relative deprivation enters the individual’s utility function 
approximately linearly, then holding individual’s i wealth and the average wealth of the 
individuals wealthier than him constant, the individual’s relative risk aversion decreases 
when he becomes more relatively deprived because he loses rank in the wealth 
distribution.  
Proof. We say that individual n has the highest (top) rank in the population, 
namely the first rank, that individual 1n  has the second rank in the population, and so 
on. Because “i” represents individual i’s position in the wealth hierarchy, that same “i” 
can be linked to individual i’s rank. Even though we cannot differentiate ( )iir w  in (6) 
with respect to i because i is a discrete variable, we can investigate the sign of the 
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derivative of ( )iir w  with respect to 
n i
n

 which for a large n  approaches a continuous 
variable. Here, a loss of rank in the wealth hierarchy increases 
n i
n

. A loss of rank can 
arise when one (or more) of the individuals to the left of individual i in the wealth 
distribution becomes richer than i, that is, moves in the wealth hierarchy to the right of i. 
We have that  
2 1
2
1
1
2
1
( )
( )
(1 ) ( ) ( )
1
(1 ) ( ) ( )
            
(1 ) ( ) ( 1) ( )
i
i
i
i
i
i i i
i
i i i i
i i i i
i
i i i ii
n i
w w w
r w n
n i
n i
w w wn
n
n i
w w w
w w n
n i
v w
v
w w
n
v








 
  

  
   





     
       
  
  
         
      
 


2 1
2
1
1
(1 ) ( )
1
           ( ) ( ) .
(1 ) ( ) ( )
i i i i
i i
i
i i
i
i
i i i
n i
w w w
n
v w v w
w wn i
v w w w
n




  

  



 
 
 
 
 
  
          
        
  
 
Because the fraction preceding 
1
( ) ( )i i
i i
w v wv
w w
 


  is positive, the sign of 
( )i ir w
n i
n



 
depends on the sign of 
1
( ) ( )i i
i i
w v wv
w w
 


 . We then have that 
( )
0i i
r w
n i
n




 if 
1
( ) ( ) 0
i
i i
i
w vv w
w w
 
 

 , which in turn can be rewritten as  
( )
1
( )
i
i
i
i
v w
w w
v w


  

. 
Given that ( )iv w  is strictly concave, the right-hand side of this last inequality is strictly 
larger than 1. Therefore, if   is close enough (from above) to 1 (recalling that (1,2)  ) 
then, indeed, 
( )
0i i
r w
n i
n




. With 
n i
n

 depending inversely on rank i , we conclude that a 
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rise in rank leads to an increase in relative risk aversion or, for that matter, that a fall in 
rank decreases relative risk aversion. Q.E.D. 
What is the intuition for the requirement that   needs to be small enough? Given 
the range of possible values of this parameter, that is, given that (1,2)  , this 
requirement implies that for relative risk aversion to decrease when rank declines, relative 
deprivation should enter the individual’s utility function approximately linearly. The 
farther away the effect of changes in relative deprivation on utility is from being linear 
(that is, when changes in relative deprivation affect utility in a concave manner), the less 
likely it is that relative risk aversion will decrease with a fall in rank. This consequence 
coincides with intuition. When the relative deprivation term enters the utility function 
concavely, the magnitude of the negative impact of relative deprivation on utility 
escalates with increases in relative deprivation. In other words, for an individual with a 
concave relative deprivation term in the utility function, high relative deprivation is more 
painful / more costly in terms of utility loss than for an individual with a more or less 
linear relative deprivation term in the utility function. Thus, it is not surprising that 
individuals whose utility is affected approximately linearly by relative deprivation will be 
more prone to increased risk taking when they fall in rank than individuals whose utility 
is affected concavely by relative deprivation.  
3. Conclusion 
Combining a standard measure of relative deprivation and a standard measure of relative 
risk aversion enabled us to link causally variation in risk-taking behavior with changes in 
the level of relative deprivation. The idea that concern about experiencing relative 
deprivation maps onto risk-taking behavior in a systematic and predictable manner 
received empirical attention in several studies, and deserves further empirical inquiry.  
Additional development of the modeling framework presented in this paper could 
involve replacement of the “partial” comparative statics, where one variable is changed 
while all other variables are held constant, with a “general” comparative statics that will 
take into account the simultaneous effects of a change in one variable on all variables. 
Such an approach will draw on the consideration that a change in risk-taking behavior 
can determine the distribution of wealth which, in turn, affects preferences. Another 
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approach might involve replacing the current modeling framework, which is based on a 
finite number of individuals, with a continuous distribution of wealth. 
The theme of this paper belongs to a research program that seeks to explain 
variation in risk-taking behavior by incorporating social preferences or, to use an 
eloquent sociological term, by incorporating “social value orientations” (SVO). The core 
idea is to focus on an individual’s position in the income or wealth distribution. For 
example, Stark (2019) studies the relative risk aversion of an individual with particular 
social preferences: his wellbeing is influenced by his relative wealth, and by how 
concerned he is about having low relative wealth. Holding constant the individual’s 
absolute wealth, Stark obtains two results. First, if the individual’s level of concern about 
low relative wealth does not change, the individual becomes more risk averse when he 
rises in the wealth hierarchy. Second, if the individual’s level of concern about low 
relative wealth intensifies when he rises in the wealth hierarchy and if, in a precise sense, 
this intensification is strong enough, then the individual becomes less risk averse: the 
individual’s desire to advance further in the wealth hierarchy is more important to him 
than possibly missing out on a higher rank. As yet another example, assuming that an 
individual’s rank in the wealth distribution is the only factor determining the individual’s 
wellbeing, Stark et al. (2019) analyze the individual’s risk preferences in relation to 
gaining or losing rank, rather than the individual’s risk preferences towards gaining or 
losing absolute wealth. Stark et al. show that in this characterization of preferences, a 
high-ranked individual is more willing than a low-ranked individual to take risks that can 
provide him with a rise in rank: relative risk aversion with respect to rank in the wealth 
distribution is a decreasing function of rank. This result is robust to incorporating (the 
level of) absolute wealth in the individual’s utility function. The risk-taking behavior of 
the poor, the relatively poor, the rich, and the relatively rich is a fertile topic for future 
inquiry, both in sociology and in economics.  
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Appendix: Robustness of Claims 1 and 2 to a generalization of the utility function 
Can Claim 1 of an inverse relationship between an individual’s relative risk aversion and 
the average wealth of wealthier individuals reside in a utility representation that is more 
general than (1)? The answer is yes. To this end, we let the utility function of the 
individual with wealth level iw  be 
                                 ( ) ) ((1 )i i i i ii iw
n i
u z w wv w
n
 
 
   



,                                 (A1) 
where, as before, )(v   is a twice differentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly concave 
function. As to )(z  , it is a continuous, thrice differentiable, strictly increasing, and 
strictly convex function.  
Because 
 )1 )( (()i i i ii i i
n i
w
n i
u z wv w
n
w
n
 
        
 
, 
and 
 
2
( ) ( )) (1i i i i ii i
n i n i
u z w w
n
w w
n
v 
    

  
 
  
 
, 
then the coefficient of relative risk aversion is  
                   
 
 
2
(1 )
( )
(
)
1
(
) ( )
i ii i i i
i
i
i i i
i
i
n i n i
w z w wv
n n
r w
w
n i n i
z w w
n
v
n
w
 
 
         
    
     
 
 

                    (A2) 
and, thus, 
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 
   
 
2
2
i i
2
i i ii i
( )
(1 )
n-i n-in-i n-i
  × z (1- )+ zw -w
) (
β )v'(w β
)
w -w
n nn n
( (1 )
i
i
i
i
i
i i i i
i i i
i
i i
n i
w
dr w n
dw n i n i
z w w
n n
n i n i n i
z w w z wv
n
w
n
v w
n

 
 
 
 
 
        
        
  
  

 
 
     
 

  


  .i iw
 
   
   
 
We know that 
 ( ) ) ((1 ) 0i i i i ii i
n i n i
u z w w
n n
w v w 
      

 

 ,  
that 
 
2
(1( ) ) ( 0,)i i ii ii iw v
n
w
i n i
u z w w
n n
 
          
  
   
and that  
  0i i
n i
z w w
n
   
 
. 
Therefore, the sign of 
( )ii
i
dr w
dw
 depends on the sign of  i i
n i
z w w
n
   
 
. If 
  0ii
n i
z w w
n
   
 
 , then 
( )ii
i
dr w
dw
 is negative, and the claim is proven. However, even 
when   0ii
n i
z w w
n
   
 
 , the inequality 
( )
0i
i
idr w
dw
  will hold true if 
 
 
( )
( )
i
i
i
i
i
i
n i
z w w
u w nn
n i u w n i
z w w
n
       
     
 
 which, for example, will be the case when 
 i i
n i
z w w
n
   
 
 is sufficiently small. 
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Can Claim 2, that the individual’s relative risk aversion decreases when the 
individual’s rank is lowered, reside in a utility representation that is more general than 
(1)? The answer is yes. Once again, we let the utility function of the individual with 
wealth level iw  be as in (A1), with the properties of )(v   and )(z   as before. Then, the 
coefficient of relative risk aversion, ( )iir w , is as in (A2). In order to investigate how 
( )iir w  depends on the individual’s rank, we evaluate the derivative 
 
 
     
     
2
( )
(1 )
  2
) (
( )
  ( )
i i
i i i
i i
i
i i
i
i i
i i i
i i i
i i ii
r w w
n i n i n i
z w wn n n
n i n i n i n i
u z zw w w w w w
n n n n
n i n i n i
u w z z
v w
w w w w w w
n
w
n n

 


          
               
  
                

 
 
 



.

  
Because ( ) 0iu w  , ( ) 0iu w  , ( ) 0z    and ( ) 0z   , a sufficient condition for 
( )
0i i
r w
n i
n




 to hold is that 
       ,2 0i ii i ii
n i n i n i
w w z zw w w w
n n n
           
 

 
  
which is equivalent to requiring that 
 
    
2i
i
i
i
i
i
n i
z w w
nn
n i n i w w
z w w
n
   
 
     

 
 . A necessary 
condition for this inequality to hold is that   0ii
n i
z w w
n
   
 
 ; this requirement is the 
same as the requirement regarding the sign of  i i
n i
z w w
n
   
 
 that was identified 
earlier in this appendix on revisiting Claim 1 and introducing )(z   under the utility 
specification in (A1). 
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